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TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION AND CERCLA LIABILITY: 
INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURERS’ ABILITY TO EXPLOIT 
AERIAL DEPOSITIONS 
CONNOR M. CALLAHAN* 
 [N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein . . . .1 
ABSTRACT  
The Trail Smelter has a long and extensive history of pollution issues. The 
most recent claim against the Trail Smelter is the aerial deposition of haz-
ardous waste theory. The Ninth Circuit has rejected attaching Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) li-
ability to the Trail Smelter under the aerial deposition theory, but this hold-
ing cannot be accepted if the goal is to control pollution. Many issues arise 
with controlling transboundary pollution, including the enforcement of in-
ternational agreements on the matter. In the absence of establishing an 
enforceable international treaty between the United States and Canada, 
CERCLA presents a viable option to help control transboundary air pollu-
tion. “Disposal’s” definition under CERCLA includes the term “deposit,” 
which promotes attaching CERCLA liability to foreign manufacturers for 
pollution harms that occur within the United States’ territorial boundaries. 
In order to reduce the harm caused by transboundary air pollution, and to 
promote CERCLA’s purpose, there is a need to recognize that CERCLA liabil-
ity can attach to the aerial depositions of hazardous waste. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is unquestionable that pollution does not respect international borders.2 
Pollution is everywhere. Pollution does not recognize territorial sovereignty, and 
thus pollution is its own master.3 Air pollution is the most omnipresent pollution 
form because it is not confined to a defined boundary, such as water pollution. Air 
fills every unoccupied space, and when the air is polluted there is no stopping where 
the pollution will end up. Hazardous waste pollution, once placed into an environ-
mental pathway, can be deposited many miles away from its originating location.4 
For example, a manufacturer’s emissions can place hazardous waste into the air, 
and that hazardous waste can be carried by air currents for many miles before the 
hazardous waste is finally deposited into an environmental medium.5 
Environmental regulation is a relatively new concept in the United States.6 It 
was not until the 1970s that the modern environmental regulation regime’s foun-
dation was established.7 These early environmental statutes set forth “the ground 
rules for national environmental protection efforts.”8 These ground rules estab-
lished methods to control air and water pollution and hazardous waste manage-
ment.9 With the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 
Congress sought to “eliminate[] the last remaining loophole in environmental law, 
that of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes.”10 
By the late 1970s, the threats presented by hazardous waste sites were placed in 
the national spotlight after the disasters at Love Canal11 and Kentucky’s Valley of 
                                                                
 2. Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trail 
for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 233, 235 (2006).   
 3. Id.   
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 159, 164 (1997). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012); The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7626 (2012).  
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 4 (1976).  
 11. Beginning in 1942 Hooker Chemical and Plastic Corporation dumped over 20,000 tons of 
hazardous waste into the Love Canal site, covered the site, and sold the property to Niagara Falls Board of 
Education for one dollar. In the 1970’s heavy precipitation caused the hazardous waste to leach from the 
ground creating a state of emergency in the surrounding community. See generally THOMAS H. FLETCHER, 
FROM LOVE CANAL TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE ON THE CANADA-U.S. BORDER 46–54 
(2003).  
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Drums12 were highly publicized.13 In response to the Love Canal and the Valley of 
Drums disasters, Congress quickly passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to clean up hazardous waste sites 
and make the responsible parties pay.14 Although RCRA was thought to have elimi-
nated the last loophole in environmental regulation, CERCLA’s enactment pre-
sented a new loophole—how to hold a party responsible for their aerial emissions 
of hazardous waste that are deposited across international borders. 
Aerial emissions rates have increased significantly worldwide as countries are 
rapidly becoming more industrialized.15 With rapid, global industrialization there 
exists an increased risk for hazardous waste to be aerially deposited across interna-
tional borders. Unintentionally, manufacturers located next to international bor-
ders may not recognize the harms their hazardous waste emissions are causing to 
the neighboring countries. For example, heavy metals such as lead can precipitate 
from a manufacturer’s emissions into a neighboring country’s ground or water. 
With an increased likelihood that hazardous waste emissions are to become more 
prominent because of the global increase in industrialization, there is an imperative 
need to establish a solution to this problem. Now is the time to hold manufacturers 
liable for the harm their aerial depositions of hazardous waste cause to neighboring 
countries and to make the responsible party pay for the cleanup. 
The Ninth Circuit was presented with an opportunity to solve this issue in Pa-
kootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (“Pakootas III”).16 However, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to allow the aerial deposition of hazardous waste to fall under CERCLA’s 
definition for disposal.17 In Pakootas III, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of dis-
posal’s definition under CERCLA will inflict significant restraints on CERCLA’s ability 
to impose liability. “Disposal,” as defined under RCRA and cross-reference by 
CERCLA, does not require that hazardous waste must first be deposited into the 
ground or water.18 Rather, the Ninth Circuit, on its own initiative, read the word 
“first” into disposal’s definition.19 The verbs used to define disposal, specifically the 
verb “deposit,” allows for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste to fall within 
“disposal’s” definition. When reading CERCLA as a whole, the statute’s purpose is 
                                                                
 12. Tens of thousands of unlabeled, discarded barrels of waste were discovered on a five-acre 
site, leaking their hazardous contents into the nearby river. See Paul W. Heiring, Private Cost Recovery Ac-
tions Under CERCLA, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1136 n.7 (1985).  
 13. Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1998).  
 14. Emile Mooney Scott, Bona Fide Protection: Fulfilling CERCLA’s Legislative Purpose by Apply-
ing Differing Definition of “Disposal”, 42 CONN. L. REV. 957, 958 (2010).  
 15. See, e.g., Elena L. Zvereva et al., Changes in Species Richness of Vascular Plants Under the 
Impact of Air Pollution: A Global Perspective, 17 GLOBAL ECOLOGY & BIOGEOGRAPHY 305, 306 (2008).  
 16. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas III), 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 17. Id. at 986.  
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012); § 9601(29) (noting that the word “first” does not appear in 
the definition).  
 19. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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to hold manufacturers liable and to provide compensation for the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste that has been released into the environment and inflicted harm.20 The 
Ninth Circuit’s “disposal” interpretation does not fully advance the purpose behind 
CERCLA’s enactment and creates a new gap in the environmental regulatory re-
gime. 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s “disposal” interpretation, liability and compensation 
provided under CERCLA for hazardous waste disposal would only be allowed when 
the hazardous waste is first placed into the ground or water.21 As a result, interna-
tional manufacturers are able to exploit aerial pathways to avoid liability and com-
pensation under CERCLA. Under the current “disposal” interpretation, there exists 
a statutory gap in the international context for hazardous waste disposal that allows 
for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste to go unpunished under CERCLA. In 
future scenarios, applying the Ninth Circuit’s “disposal” interpretation will lead to 
abuse by international manufacturers who first place their hazardous waste into 
the air, and then allow the hazardous waste to precipitate from the air into the 
ground or water. Allowing for the aerial disposal of hazardous waste to go unpun-
ished and unregulated will result in major ecological hazards, health ramifications, 
and abuse by international manufacturers. 
To address the aerial disposal of hazardous waste and CERCLA, this article ex-
plores both the extensive history of the Trail Smelter and CERCLA’s interpretation. 
Part II of this article starts with a brief discussion of the Trail Smelter’s litigation 
history, beginning with the Trail Smelter Arbitration and ending with the State of 
Washington asserting the aerial deposition theory.22 Part III of this article explores 
the current international agreements between the United States and Canada and 
recognizes that the Air Quality Agreement needs to be revisited to solve future aer-
ial disposals between the two countries.23 Part IV of this article walks through the 
statutory interpretation of CERCLA, assessing the language, overall statutory 
scheme, legislative history, and the United States’ Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) disposal interpretation under CERCLA.24 Finally, Part V concludes by 
declaring that CERCLA does allow for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste as a 
disposal form.25 The need to address aerial depositions as a disposal method under 
CERCLA is of the upmost importance. Accepting aerial depositions as a disposal un-
der CERCLA will tighten the United States’ environmental regulatory scheme and 
ensure that manufacturers are paying for the harm and cleanup that their pollution 
causes. 
 
 
                                                                
 20. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
 21. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1024; Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 983–84 (pro-
hibiting the aerial deposition theory).  
 22. See infra Part II.  
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra Part V. 
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II. THE TRAIL SMELTER 
The Trail Smelter, located in Trail, British Columbia, “stands like an industrial 
fortress on the bank of the Columbia River, [ten] miles north of the border between 
Canada and the United States.”26 Built in the late 1890s, the Trail Smelter began its 
life as a processing station for the Rossland mines.27 After receiving substantial sup-
port from the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Trail Smelter quickly “became an indus-
trial center for the entire region.”28 As the operations at the Trail Smelter expanded 
because of increased access to ore in the region, the emissions produced from the 
smelter dramatically increased.29 The sulfur dioxide emissions from the Trail Smel-
ter numbered in the thousands of tons per month, causing harmful impacts to ani-
mals and vegetation in the surrounding Trail, British Columbia community.30 Begin-
ning in 1916, the Trail Smelter was immersed in litigation concerning the damage 
done to crops and forests within the smelter’s vicinity.31  As litigation continued in 
the Canadian tribunals, farmers from the American side of the border provided tes-
timony supporting the Trail Smelter, stating that their “animals, and crops had not 
been smoke-damaged.”32 In 1924, a Canadian judge ruled against the Trail Smelter 
and ordered the Trail Smelter to pay damages from harms caused in the Trail com-
munity.33 In response to the lawsuits brought by Canadian land owners, and in part 
to improvements, the smokestacks at the Trail Smelter were increased to a height 
just over four hundred feet to help disperse the smelter’s air emissions.34 The in-
creased smokestack heights would only present new problems, brought by Ameri-
can farmers, to the Trail Smelter.35 
As the emissions from the Trail Smelter increased, the emissions were carried 
by the wind into Washington State’s Columbia Valley.36 With emissions from the 
Trail Smelter becoming more prominent in the Columbia Valley, farmers of Stevens 
                                                                
 26. Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the Extraterritorial Application of 
CERCLA, 1018 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L REV. 1, 2 (2005).   
 27. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 2, at 243. In 1906, the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Com-
pany of Canada, Ltd. purchased the Trail Smelter, but would later rename itself to Cominco in 1966. Hess, 
supra note 26, at 2, 5. It was not until a 2001 merger with Teck Ltd. that the Trail Smelter would be owned 
by Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. Id. at 5.  
 28. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 2, at 244. 
 29. Id.   
 30. Id.   
 31. JOHN D. WIRTH, SMELTER SMOKE IN NORTH AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 14 
(2000). 
 32. Id. The Trail Smelter asserted the defense that the damage to the surrounding crops and 
forests was probably caused by natural condition and improper farming methods rather than the smelter’s 
emissions. Id. But, the Trail Smelter did agree that if the damage could be linked to the smelter’s emissions 
the Trail Smelter would pay for the damage caused. Id.  
 33. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 2, at 245. 
 34. WIRTH, supra note 31, at 14. 
 35. Id. at 14–15. 
 36. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 2, at 245. 
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County, Washington, brought the first United States claim against the Trail Smel-
ter.37 With more and more American farmers bringing claims against the Trail Smel-
ter, the stage was set for the notorious Trail Smelter Arbitration.38 
A. A Brief Recount of the Trail Smelter Arbitration 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration,39 has become “a landmark decision in interna-
tional environmental law.”40 To resolve the Trail Smelter’s pollution issues, a special 
arbitral panel,41 was appointed to reach answers for the following questions: 
(1) Whether damage caused by the Trail Smelter in the State of Washing-
ton has occurred since the first day of January 1932, and, if so, what in-
demnity should be paid therefor? 
(2) In the event of the answer to the first part of the preceding question 
being in the affirmative, whether the Trail Smelter should be required to 
refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the future and, 
if so, to what extent? 
(3) In light of the answer to the preceding question, what measures or ré-
gime, if any, should be adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter? 
(4) What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be paid on account of 
any decision or decisions rendered by the Tribunal pursuant to the two 
preceding questions?42 
With respect to the first question, the panel concluded that the Trail Smelter’s 
emissions had caused damage to the State of Washington, and thus the Trail Smel-
ter must compensate the State of Washington for the damage caused in the amount 
of $78,000.43 The panel went on to answer question two by stating that “the Trail 
Smelter shall refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the future 
to the extent set forth in” the adopted regime.44 However, the information provided 
during the 1938 arbitration prohibited the panel from implementing a permanent 
regime to avoid future damage to the State of Washington.45 Instead, the panel did 
implement a temporary regime to help reduce future damages to the State of 
                                                                
 37. Id. at 246. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938) [hereinafter Trail Smelter I]; 
Trail Smelter II, supra note 1, at 1938. 
 40. Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, 
and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 
364 (2005).  
 41. The Canadian and United States governments first turned to the International Joint Commis-
sion (“IJC”) to resolve the dispute. WIRTH, supra note 31, at 3. The IJC issued an award of $350,000 that was 
subsequently turned down by the United States because of pressure from the State of Washington desiring 
a higher award. Id. at 4. In rejecting the IJC’s award, a three-member special arbitration panel was estab-
lished to resolve the dispute. Id. 
 42. Trail Smelter I, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1911.  
 43. Id. at 1933. 
 44. Id. at 1934. 
 45. Id. 
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Washington.46 Two years after the temporary regime was laid out by the panel, the 
panel obtained the adequate information and data to impose a permanent re-
gime.47 In the 1940 arbitration, the panel answered question four stating that the 
permanent regime would likely remove the causes that have damaged the State of 
Washington and will likely prevent future damage.48 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration allowed the operations at the smelter’s facility 
to continue, provided that it operated under the permanent regime prescribed by 
the panel.49 However, the panel did provide one caveat to the Trail Smelter’s con-
tinued operations—if landowners in the State of Washington experienced damage 
from the future operations, the Trail Smelter could be required to pay a maximum 
amount of $7,500 per year.50 The Trail Smelter Arbitration was only the starting 
point in a long line of litigation concerning the Trail Smelter’s pollution. 
B. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals Line of Litigation 
After the Trail Smelter Arbitration, Teck Cominco Metals51 (“Teck Cominco”) 
continued to pollute by discharging hazardous waste directly into the Columbia 
River.52 The EPA stated, in an assessment on the Upper Columbia River (UCR), that 
the discharge into the Columbia River by Teck Cominco included an average of “18 
kilograms per day (kg/d) of arsenic, 62 kg/d of cadmium, 200 kg/d of lead, and 7,400 
kg/d of zinc . . . [other] operations contributed up to 4 kg/d of total mercury and 
350 kg/d of dissolved zinc.”53 After the assessment’s completion, the EPA found that 
the UCR Site qualified “as one of the nation’s most contaminated sites.”54 The as-
sessment induced settlement discussion between the EPA and Teck Cominco and 
caused the EPA to determine the necessary remedial action for the hazardous waste 
released from Teck Cominco’s facility.55 In attempts to avoid litigation, the EPA 
sought to enter an Unilateral Administrative Order requiring Teck Cominco to con-
duct a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study.56 
When attempts to get Teck Cominco to comply with the Unilateral Adminis-
trative Order failed, two members of the Colville Tribe brought suit under CERCLA’s 
                                                                
 46. See id. at 1934–37 (describing the temporary regime).  
 47. Trail Smelter II, supra note 1, at 1966; see Trail Smelter I, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1974–78 (describing 
the permanent regime).  
 48. Trail Smelter II, supra note 1, at 1980.  
 49. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 2, at 253. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Hess, supra note 26, at 4 (The owner and operator of the Trail Smelter facility in the twenty-
first century). 
 52. Id.  
  53. U.S. EPA, EPA 910-R-02-001, UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER EXPANDED SITE INSPECTION NORTHEAST 
WASHINGTON 2-11 (2003).  
 54. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 2, at 268 (“[P]ursuant to CERCLA’s Hazard Ranking System found 
that the Site was eligible for listing on the National Priority List”).  
 55. See Upper Columbia River Site, EPA No. CERCLA-10-2004-0018 (Dec. 11, 2003). 
 56. Id. at 4, ¶13. 
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citizen suit provision.57 In response, Teck Cominco sought to have the lawsuit dis-
missed claiming that CERCLA did not apply to Teck Cominco’s activities in Canada 
because such application “would be an impermissible extraterritorial application of 
United States law.”58 When addressing the extraterritorial application issue of 
CERCLA outside the United States’ boundaries, the United States Supreme Court 
has stated, “that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territo-
rial boundaries of the United States.”59 
i. The Extraterritorial Application of CERCLA 
The presumption for courts within the United States is that domestic statutes 
only apply to persons or conduct within the territorial boundaries, thus applying a 
domestic statute outside territorial boundaries is presumed invalid.60 There are two 
exceptions to this presumption—congressional intent61 and domestic adverse ef-
fects.62 Congress can, on its own initiative, expressly state that a statute is intended 
to apply extraterritorially.63 Under the congressional intent exception, the require-
ment that Congress expressly state its intent has become more relaxed, and Con-
gress need only provide clear evidence of an intent for a domestic statute to apply 
extraterritorially.64 Since CERCLA is widely known as an ambiguous statute that 
lacks legislative history,65 the congressional intent expectation is inapplicable for 
CERCLA’s extraterritorial application. 
The domestic adverse effects exception presents a more viable option for 
CERCLA’s extraterritorial application to Teck Cominco. Domestic statutes are per-
mitted to attach liability to foreign entities when the conduct or effects largely oc-
cur within the United States’ territorial boundaries.66 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, on 
its face, side stepped the issue of whether CERCLA can apply extraterritorially.67 
However, when applying the domestic adverse effects exception, Teck Cominco’s 
conduct took place within the United States’ territorial boundaries, and had adverse 
effects on the State of Washington and the United States.68 
                                                                
 57. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982, at *1 (E.D. 
Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (seeking to have Teck Cominco comply with the Administrative Order on Consent).  
 58. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I), 452 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 59. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).   
 60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402, 403 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  
 61. See generally Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244.   
 62. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  
 63. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.   
 64. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993); see also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 
509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (requiring that courts need to look at all available evidence to determine congres-
sional intent).  
 65. John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1406 (1997). 
 66. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
 67. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I), 452 F.3d 1066, 1073–79 (9th Cir. 
2006).   
 68. The extraterritorial application of CERCLA is beyond the scope of this article. For a more in-
depth discussion, see Jennifer S. Addis, A Missed Opportunity: How Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 
Could Have Clarified the Extraterritorial Doctrine, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1011 (2009).   
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The Ninth Circuit, in determining whether CERCLA can be applied extraterri-
torially, relied upon the language set out in section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA69—“any 
person who . . . arrange[s] for disposal.”70 The United States Supreme Court has set 
forth a two-part inquiry to determine whether the phrase “any person” applies to 
a foreign entity.71 In order for a foreign entity to fall under the phrase “any person” 
used in statutory language, a court must first have jurisdiction over the party and, 
additionally, Congress must have intended for the phrase to apply to a foreign entity 
who has a presence within the United States’ territorial boundaries.72 The Ninth 
Circuit found that the first requirement was established on the grounds that the 
Eastern District Court of Washington had personal jurisdiction over Teck Cominco 
because there was an “alleged[] tortious act aimed at the State of Washington.”73 
Next, in the second part of the inquiry, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that CERCLA is 
only concerned with imposing liability for hazardous waste cleanup, and CERCLA is 
not concerned with regulating the manner in which an entity disposed of hazardous 
waste.74 Therefore, since the CERCLA is only concerned with the hazardous waste 
disposal site, the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco’s conduct in the UCR Site 
is a domestic issue—even though the source is located outside the United States.75 
ii. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals and the Theory of Aerial Deposition 
After the setting forth of the river pathway claims76, the Colville Tribe mem-
bers and the State of Washington amended their complaint to allege the aerial dep-
osition theory.77 The new complaint stated that in 1906 Teck Cominco had begun 
discharging hazardous waste into the atmosphere, and the discharged hazardous 
waste traveled through the air and was deposited at the UCR Site.78 In response to 
the new aerial deposition theory, Teck Cominco moved to have these claims 
stricken or dismissed because CERCLA does not impose liability when hazardous 
waste travels through the air.79 A month after Teck Cominco’s motion to dismiss 
was denied, the Ninth Circuit issued the decision for Center for Community Action 
& Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”),80 holding that diesel 
particulate matter transported by air currents did not qualify as a disposal.81 In re-
                                                                
 69. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1075.  
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 71. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 631 (1818).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1076. 
 74. Id. at 1079. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas II), 646 F.3d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1069–71.  
 77. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas III), 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 980. 
 80. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) 
 81. Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 980. 
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sponse to the BNSF decision, Teck Cominco filed a motion to reconsider the ques-
tion of “whether aerial emissions leading to disposal of hazardous substances ‘into 
or on any land or water’ are actionable under CERCLA.”82 
The Ninth Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, answered the question in the neg-
ative, stating that allowing for such disposal would create inconsistencies within 
CERCLA, and would destroy the innocent land owner defense.83 The Ninth Circuit 
incorrectly answered the question presented on interlocutory appeal. Each pro-
ceeding section of this article will illustrate how the Ninth Circuit has created a new 
loophole in environmental statutes for foreign manufacturers and how the lan-
guage and statutory structure of CERCLA permits the aerial deposition theory. 
III. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
The situation in Pakootas III presents a unique problem that arises when a 
smelter is near an international border. Teck Cominco’s smelter is located only ten 
miles north of the United States and Canada border.84 The relationship between the 
United States and Canada has been described as one of the most effective and old-
est environmental collaborations.85 Over forty international agreements between 
the United States and Canada have been made to protect and manage the ecosys-
tems along the international border and to safeguard environmental quality.86 
Some of the most significant environmental agreements between the United States 
and Canada include the Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint Commis-
sion, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the United States-Canada Air Qual-
ity Agreement, and the Columbia River Agreement.87 The main focus of this section 
will be on the United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement. 
Prior to the United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement, the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration “marked the beginning of a heightened consciousness of international 
environmental issues worldwide.”88 However, the Stockholm Declaration was faced 
with four difficulties in effectively controlling transboundary air pollution: (1) not 
providing nations with guidance as to what was considered unacceptable conduct, 
(2) there was no effective enforcement method for violations, (3) the declaration 
did not provide adequate preventive actions, and (4) the declaration did not solve 
the issue of causation for air pollution injuries.89 In 1991, the United States and Can-
ada signed the bilateral Air Quality Agreement reaffirming and strengthening their 
commitments under the Stockholm Declaration.90 The Air Quality Agreement rec-
                                                                
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. at 983–86. 
 84. Id. at 978. 
85.    International Cooperation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/international-
cooperation/epa-collaboration-canada (last updated Dec. 8, 2017).  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing 
Transboundary Air Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 421, 430 (1993).    
 89. Id. at 430–31.   
 90. Id. at 444.   
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ognizes “that transboundary air pollution can cause significant harm to natural re-
sources of vital environmental, cultural, and economic importance, and to human 
health in both countries.”91 Although the Air Quality Agreement provides more 
commitments between the United States and Canada, such as the exchange of in-
formation regarding air pollution, the Air Quality Agreement still suffers from the 
same four difficulties as the Stockholm Declaration. The Air Quality Agreement does 
not provide for an effective enforcement method should one country fail to limit its 
transboundary air pollution.92 Lacking an enforcement mechanism, the Air Quality 
Agreement is a mere instrument that shows the United States and Canada have 
reached a consensus not to cause significant environmental harm to one another. 
International treaties operate on the basic principle that nations are only 
bound by the treaty through their voluntary consent.93 Once a treaty has been con-
sented to, issues can arise concerning the clarity of the treaty’s obligations and the 
treaty’s inability to effectively sanction noncompliance.94 The Prisoner’s Dilemma95 
illustrates why collective agreements do not work to their full potential.96 The con-
cept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is used to show “that rational decisions can be det-
rimental to the satisfaction of self-interest and the achievement of mutual good.”97 
As the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates, “nations may do better under mutual co-
operation but will face incentives to free-ride and defect from the cooperative so-
lution.”98 In the context of climate change, free-riding allows a country to reap the 
“benefits from the environmental public good of less climate change that is created 
by other countries” while still polluting.99 Thus, a country that sacrifices not pollut-
ing to control climate change shares the benefit with countries that are free-riding 
and still polluting.100 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma concept shows that international environmental trea-
ties are only effective if all the parties to the treaty are committed to following the 
obligations set forth by the treaty. When a treaty lacks an enforcement mechanism, 
countries are more likely to become free-riders because they are not in danger of 
consequences for their noncompliance. Here, any agreement between the United 
                                                                
 91. Agreement on Air Quality, Can.-U.S., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676.  
 92. See id. (lacking an enforcement provision).  
 93. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1314 
(1997).  
 94. Id. 
 95.  “[T]he Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . assumes that every actor solely acts individualistically to max-
imize his or her instrumentally salient rewards, therefore making defection the only rational choice.” S.M. 
AMADAE, PRISONERS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 31 (2016). For the standard nar-
rative of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see id. at 28–29.  
 96. Marvin S. Soroos, Global Change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 31 J. 
OF PEACE RES. 317, 325 (1994).  
 97. MAX BLACK, PERPLEXITIES: RATIONAL CHOICE, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA, METAPHOR, POETIC AMBIGUITY, 
AND OTHER PUZZLES 113 (1990).  
 98. Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 
GEO. L. J. 749, 762 (1999). 
 99. Soroos, supra note 96, at 326.  
 100. Id. 
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States and Canada will likely present a Prisoner’s Dilemma issue. Under the Air Qual-
ity Agreement, either the United States or Canada may find it more beneficial to 
not comply with the agreement and pollute the air while taking part in the benefits 
from the other country complying with the Air Quality Agreement. Since there is no 
enforcement provision within the Air Quality Agreement, either the United States 
or Canada can free-ride on the other country’s compliance without fear of conse-
quences. Thus, there is a need to revisit the Air Quality Agreement to incorporate 
some enforcement mechanism to avoid free-riding. Revisiting the Air Quality Agree-
ment could present a possible solution to the aerial deposition theory presented by 
Pakootas III, and therefore avoid the application of United States law to Canadian 
entities. 
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND DISPOSAL’S DEFINITION UNDER CERCLA 
“Clearly, neither a logician nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of 
CERCLA.”101 Generally, hazardous waste statutes operate in a manner to provide 
remedies for parties from the consequences that stem from hazardous waste pol-
lution.102 Specifically, “CERCLA sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the cleanup 
of hazardous waste sites, and imposes liability for cleanup costs on the parties re-
sponsible for the release or potential release of hazardous substances into the en-
vironment.”103 Many hazardous waste statutes operate prospectively, however, 
CERCLA is unique and has been constructed and interpreted to operate retroac-
tively.104 Applying CERCLA retroactively stems from the presumption that when 
Congress has intended for a statute to only apply prospectively, Congress expressly 
states such intention.105 CERCLA’s text does not expressly “limit or deny liability for 
response costs incurred” prior to CERCLA’s enactment, and ,therefore, CERCLA is 
not limited to only prospective remedies.106 Further, CERCLA’s purpose and statu-
tory scheme illustrates that CERCLA was created in a manner that would impose 
retroactive liability.107 When attempting to understand CERCLA, the overall scheme 
must be assessed. Statutory provisions are not constructed in a vacuum, and 
CERCLA is no exception to this notion.108 Moreover, CERCLA is a difficult statute to 
navigate, and is “a [complex] maze—of sections, subsections, definition, excep-
tions, defenses, and administrative provisions.”109 To determine if CERCLA offers a 
solution for aerial disposals of hazardous waste, the daunting task of interpreting 
CERCLA must be done. 
                                                                
 101. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 102. NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 3B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 77:5 
(Westlaw, 7th ed. 2017) [hereinafter SINGER]. 
 103. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I), 452 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 104. SINGER, supra note 102, at § 77:5.  
 105. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1079 (D. Colo. 1985). Except for CERCLA, 
most statutes imposing liability for natural resource damages were intended to apply in a prospective man-
ner. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108.  Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 109. Id.   
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Courts are tasked with interpreting what Congress has enacted.110 To begin, 
courts first look to the statute’s language.111 Next, courts move on to interpreting 
the statute as a whole, including assessing the statute’s policy and objectives.112 
Reviewing a statute’s words and language requires that the words and language be 
placed in context of the entire statute.113 No statutory provision should be reviewed 
in solitude.114 If the statute is still ambiguous, courts may look to the legislative his-
tory to determine the congressional intent behind the statute’s enactment.115 Fur-
ther, if the statute is still ambiguous after reviewing the statute’s legislative history, 
the administrative agency in charge of administering the statute can provide an in-
terpretation that is persuasive to the courts.116 Lastly, since there are multiple haz-
ardous waste statutes, interpreting a single hazardous waste statute must be done 
in a manner that produces a “harmonious statutory scheme” among all hazardous 
waste statutes governing the same subject matter.117 
A. CERCLA’s Statutory Language and Disposal’s Definition 
When examining a statute’s language courts must follow the United States 
Supreme Court’s guidance “and adhere to the ‘Plain Meaning Rule.’”118 Unless the 
statute’s plain meaning “leads to an unreasonable result or a result contrary to leg-
islative intent,” the statute’s plain meaning is controlling.119 The United States Su-
preme Court has articulated the “Plain Meaning Rule” as: 
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, 
be sought in the language in which the act is frame, and if that is plain, and 
if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body 
which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to 
its terms. Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one 
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are 
to aid doubtful meaning need no discussion.120 
Further, “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition . . . [courts] must fol-
low that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”121 At issue 
                                                                
 110. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001).  
 111. E.g., Watt v. Energy Atomic Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 162 (1981).  
 112. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 877.  
 113. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a 
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”). 
 114. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133.  
 115. SINGER, supra note 102, at § 77.5. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 119. Steven Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes --Or Not: Plain Meaning and Other Phantoms, 10 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 325 (2009); see also Sigmon Coal Co., Inc. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 
2000) (indicating that if a statute’s plain meaning is still ambiguous legislative history can be consulted). 
 120.  Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citations omitted).   
 121. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). 
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in Pakootas III is disposal’s definition, which CERCLA derives by cross-referencing 
RCRA.122 With regards to hazardous waste statutes, such as CERCLA, “the language 
used in the statute is given its natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood 
meaning, unless the term has acquired a peculiar or technical meaning as a result 
of statutory definition. ”123 Here, the term disposal is not given a technical meaning 
under CERCLA,124 rather disposal’s technical definition is provided under RCRA.125 
Disposal’s definition under CERCLA presents an issue in attaching CERCLA liability to 
manufacturers for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste.126 
Prior to reaching what the term “disposal” encompasses, there are a number 
of prerequisites that must be established for governmental response under 
CERCLA.127 Before any action under CERCLA can occur there must first be a release 
or a threat of release.128 Once a release, or threat of release, of hazardous waste 
has been identified, the term “disposal” becomes operative.129 To recover response 
costs under CERCLA, the term “disposal” is used to identify who caused the hazard-
ous waste to be placed into the environment.130 Then, the terms used to define 
release allow a plaintiff to point to when the release occurred and to establish when 
the party’s liability began.131 In Pakootas III, the release occurred when Teck 
Cominco “emitted hazardous substances into the air.”132 After the hazardous waste 
was emitted into the air, the hazardous waste was allowed to precipitate out of the 
air and be deposited into the UCR Site, thus, as argued by the State of Washington, 
constituting a disposal.133 The aerial deposition theory presented by the State of 
Washington was, however, rejected by the Ninth Circuit.134 
CERCLA does not provide its own definition for disposal, or any clarification 
for what disposal means.135 Instead, CERCLA cross-references RCRA for the defini-
tion of “disposal.”136 Under RCRA the term “disposal” is defined as: 
[T]he discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of 
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that 
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter 
                                                                
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2012).  
 123. SINGER, supra note 102, at § 77.5. 
 124. § 9601(29).  
 125. Id.; § 6903(3). 
 126. See Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 985–86.  
 127. PETER L. GRAY, THE SUPERFUND MANUAL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CERCLA LITIGATION 4 (2016). 
 128. § 9604(a); see also GRAY, supra note 127; § 9601(22) (defining the term release).  
 129. § 9604(a); § 9601(22).  
 130. GRAY, supra note 127, at 123.  
 131.  3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990); see also § 
9601(22) (defining release).  
 132. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas III), 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 986. 
 135. § 9601(29). 
 136. Id.  
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the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, 
including ground waters.137 
The definition provided by RCRA consists mainly of a list of verbs that describe 
the act of disposing hazardous waste into water or the ground.138 The list of verbs 
used to define disposal are not further defined under CERCLA.139 Some insight into 
the meaning of the words used to define disposal can be gained by examining 
CERCLA’s definition for release.140 The term release is defined under CERCLA as “any 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, es-
caping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment . . . .”141 Including the 
term disposing in CERCLA’s definition for release suggests that release is meant to 
be construed broader than the definition of disposal.142 With the understanding 
that release determines when a party becomes liable under CERCLA, the broader 
interpretation of release is required to comport with CERCLA’s purpose of holding 
responsible parties liable.143 The definition of release also includes terms that are 
not present in disposal’s definition.144 Given that the term release is used to estab-
lish when liability under CERCLA occurs, the broader definition promotes CERCLA’s 
broad reach to establish liability.145 
In addition, the broader interpretation of release is supported by Congress’s 
decision to include the term ”emitting” in defining release and omitting it from dis-
posal’s definition.146 Although it is not conclusive, the omission of the term “emit-
ting” from RCRA’s definition of disposal suggests that hazardous waste emissions 
                                                                
 137. § 6903(3). The definition of disposal under CERCLA is not required to be identical to the def-
inition given to disposal under RCRA. See Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 984 n.9. Although CERCLA cross-refer-
ences RCRA for the definition of disposal, the United States Supreme Court states that when “the same 
word is used in different statutes employing different strategies for protecting the environment, ‘[c]ontext 
[also] counts.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 575–76 
(2007)). Both, “CERCLA and RCRA both address hazardous waste disposal but in different ways.” Pakootas 
III, 830 F.3d at 984 n.9. “RCRA regulates the generation of hazardous waste primarily by requiring generators 
to comply with handling, record-keeping, storage, and monitoring requirements.” Id.; see also City of Chi. v. 
Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 332 (1994) (discussing the EPA’s promulgation of standards that govern haz-
ardous waste owners and operators, generators, and transporters). In comparison, CERCLA “is not a regu-
latory statute.” Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 984 n.9 (quoting Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas 
I), 452 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). CERCLA is concerned with mak-
ing hazardous waste generators financially responsible for hazardous waste cleanup, although both RCRA 
and CERCLA can be used to compel the cleanup of hazardous waste, only CERCLA allows for the recovery of 
the cost already incurred. Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 984 n.9   
 138. See § 6903(3).  
 139. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 140. Id. 
 141. § 9601(22) (emphasis added).  
 142. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 878. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id.  
 145. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 
1992); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 146. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014). The 
inclusion of the term emitting in the definition of release relates to CERCLA’s federally permitted release 
exception, §§ 9601(10)(H), 9607(j), where Congress seemed to intend for “CERCLA to apply to emissions of 
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would not constitute a disposal.147 Given that there seems to be an indication that 
the term disposal was not meant to cover aerial emissions that precipitate into sur-
rounding water or ground, disposal’s definition does include the term deposit, 
which provides support for the inclusion of aerial emission. The indication that the 
term disposal was not intended to include the aerial disposition of hazardous waste 
can be explained by CERCLA’s use of RCRA’s definition for disposal. RCRA’s defini-
tion for disposal is focused on “any solid or hazardous waste . . .” that is disposed 
“into or on any land or water . . . .”148 Additionally, RCRA defines hazardous waste 
as “solid waste, or combination of solid wastes. . .”149 RCRA further defines solid 
waste as “any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply 
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, in-
cluding solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material . . . .”150 RCRA’s stat-
utory scheme is concerned with the management of solid hazardous waste, and 
once the hazardous waste is placed into the air the hazardous waste is no longer a 
solid waste.151 However, aerial depositions of hazardous waste are not beyond 
RCRA’s regulatory scheme.152 CERCLA, on the other hand, seems to include the no-
tion that air emissions fall within the scope of CERCLA’s liability provisions. In sup-
port, when Congress enacted CERCLA, the legislative history suggests that CERCLA 
was intended to apply to emissions up to the point the Clean Air Act would take 
over.153 However, the Ninth Circuit in Pakootas III points out that the federally per-
mitted release exception could be read as only applying to emissions as a form of 
release and not as a form of disposal.154 
The Ninth Circuit has expressly set forth its own theory on how a term used to 
define another term will be interpreted.155 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has rejected 
the use of the “absolute binary ‘active/passive’ distinction used by some courts.”156 
Many of the terms used to define disposal have both an active and passive defini-
tion, and the Ninth Circuit has held that the facts of the case determine whether 
the active or passive definition is applied.157 Therefore, instead of focusing on 
whether the terms used to define disposal have an active or passive definition, the 
facts of each case must be assessed to determine whether the hazardous waste’s 
                                                                
hazardous substances up to the point where it ran into the Clean Air Act.”  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 
Ltd. (Pakootas III), 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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 148. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012). 
 149. § 6903(5). 
 150. § 6903(27). 
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 157. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 878–79.  
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movement falls within the plain meaning of a term used to define disposal.158 When 
looking at the list of words used to define disposal, the term deposit provides an 
answer to encompass hazardous waste precipitating from aerial emissions into the 
surrounding land or water as a form of disposal. 
The term deposit is not provided any further meaning in either CERCLA or 
RCRA, and the courts have not provided their own definition.159 Since no further 
definition of deposit is provided, the common meaning and understanding of the 
term should, and can be, used.160 When terms are not given any further definition, 
courts must “construe a statute to give every word some operative effect.”161 The 
term deposit is defined as “[t]o put or set down; place. To lay down or leave behind 
by a natural process.”162 The term deposit, which is used to define disposal, encom-
passes the aerial disposal of hazardous waste theory. Once the hazardous waste is 
placed into the air by a smokestack, the hazardous waste particulates are carried 
by the natural process of air currents and allowed to precipitate out of the air.163 
None of the other terms used to define disposal are similar to the term deposit, and 
thus deposit presents the only viable option for the aerial deposition theory. Alt-
hough the Ninth Circuit has rejected the definition of deposit to encompass the 
gradual spread of hazardous waste through passive soil migration, the definition 
still allows for the aerial deposition of hazardous substances.164 
Based on the common understanding of deposit, hazardous waste that is 
placed, put down, or left behind would fall within the statutory definition of dis-
posal under CERCLA.165 The hazardous waste at issue in Pakootas III was first placed 
into the air via Teck Cominco’s smokestacks, then the hazardous waste was allowed 
to fall, or precipitate, from the air into the land and water of the UCR Site.166 The 
Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the State of Washington’s aerial deposition theory, stated 
that Washington’s “interpretation appears a reasonable enough construction of § 
9607(a)(3), and if we were writing on a blank slate, we might be persuaded to adopt 
it.”167 The common definition of deposit, as the Ninth Circuit recognizes, is likely to 
incorporate the aerial deposition theory presented by the State of Washington. 
                                                                
 158. Id. at 879; see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem. Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879); Uniroyal Chem. Co., Inc. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 
252 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that in arranger-liability cases courts must focus on the type of activity that 
allowed the hazardous waste to enter the environment).  
 159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012); §§ 9601–9628; Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 878.  
 160. SINGER, supra note 102, at § 77:5. 
 161. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).  
 162. Deposit, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
AMERICAN HERITAGE]. To provide further clarification the Oxford English Dictionary defines deposit as “[t]o 
lay, put, or set down; to place in a more or less permanent position of rest. To be laid down or precipitated, 
to settle.” Deposit, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 163. Deposit, AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 162. The process of being left behind by air currents 
would qualify as a passive definition of the term deposit.    
 164. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879 (holding that the petroleum production by-product’s passive 
soil migration was only remotely akin to the term leaking and still did not constitute a leaking).  
 165. Deposit, AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 162. 
 166. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas III), 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 167. Id. at 983. 
 
162 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
  
The Ninth Circuit articulated one attenuated reason why the aerial deposition 
theory does not fall within the definition of deposit, and is, therefore, outside the 
boundaries of disposal’s definition.168 In a prior decision, Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. 
v. Unocal Corporation (“Carson Harbor”),169 the Ninth Circuit suggested that allow-
ing for the term “deposit” to include the passive soil migration of hazardous waste, 
would virtually cause all hazardous waste contaminations to fall under the defini-
tion of disposal, therefore opening up a floodgate of liability under CERCLA.170 The 
majority in Carson Harbor, which provides the Ninth Circuit the support for not al-
lowing the aerial deposition theory in Pakootas III, stated that although the com-
mon definition of deposit includes placement through geological processes, Con-
gress did not intend for disposal to cover the geological process or migration of haz-
ardous waste.171 Rather, geological migration of hazardous waste was covered 
when Congress included the term “leaching” in the definition of release.172 How-
ever, the reasoning in Carson Harbor is problematic. The term “leaching” only co-
vers the migration of hazardous waste through “the action of percolating liquid.”173 
In Pakootas III, liquid was not the vehicle used to migrate the hazardous waste.174 
Instead, air currents were the vehicle used to migrate the hazardous waste across 
the border.175  
In Pakootas III, the Ninth Circuit relies upon the interpretation of disposal set 
forth in Carson Harbor.176 Judge Fletcher, dissenting in Carson Harbor, recognized 
that by failing to allow for soil migration to fall within the meaning of deposit, and 
therefore not be encompassed by disposal’s definition, would frustrate and contra-
dict the purpose behind CERCLA’s enactment.177 More recently, the Ninth Circuit in 
BNSF held that under RCRA disposal occurs when the “solid waste is first placed 
‘into or on any land or water’ and is thereafter ‘emitted into the air.’”178 However, 
BNSF, as observed by the Ninth Circuit, is an interpretation on RCRA’s definition of 
disposal, and therefore only offers persuasive textual analysis for CERCLA’s defini-
tion of disposal.179 The distinction between CERCLA and RCRA can be explained by 
using canons of construction. 
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Canons of construction are “judge-created tools” use to derive and define the 
meaning of a statute’s language.180 Although canons of construction are judge-cre-
ated, they are not mandatory rules.  But, they have been used as important deter-
minants in some cases.181 Canons of construction cannot be used side by side with 
other statutory interpretation theories because statutory interpretation theories 
can “rely on canons of construction or reject them.”182 However, canons of con-
struction are helpful in providing a basis “of supposed actual legislative intent and 
are, therefore, modestly useful in carrying legislative meaning.”183 This basis pro-
vided by canons of construction prompts “the mind to a vision comparable to that 
possessed by the legislature.”184 Through the tools provided by canons of construc-
tion, disposal’s definition should provide for the inclusion of Washington State’s 
aerial deposition theory. 
Provided that both CERCLA and RCRA concern hazardous waste, the whole 
statute rule, in pari materia, provides that statutes regarding the same subject mat-
ter are to be read in relation to one another.185 However, given that both CERCLA 
and RCRA deal with the same subject matter, the “[c]haracterization of the [stat-
ute’s] object or purpose is more important than [the] characterization of subject 
matter to determine whether different statutes are closely enough related to justify 
interpreting one in light of the other.”186 Courts have generally held that statutes 
are not in pari materia when multiple statutes concern the same subject matter but 
have different objectives and purposes.187 The purpose and objectives behind 
CERCLA’s enactment, which is “[t]o provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and 
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and 
the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites,” differs from RCRA.188 
RCRA’s purpose and objectives are “[t]o provide technical and financial assistance 
for the development of management plans and facilities for the recovery of energy 
and other resources from discarded materials and for the safe disposal of discarded 
materials, and to regulate the management of hazardous waste.”189 A quick glance 
at the purposes and objectives behind both CERCLA and RCRA shows that each is 
focused on different goals. While RCRA is concerned with the development of waste 
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management plans and the safe disposal of hazardous waste,190 CERCLA is con-
cerned with holding parties liable for the cleanup and any damage done after the 
hazardous waste is placed into the environment.191 
Given the two distinct purposes and objectives behind CERCLA and RCRA, 
there is a justification to interpret both statutes separately. Although CERCLA cross-
references RCRA to define “disposal,”192 the differing purposes behind each allows 
for a different reading of the definition of “disposal” under CERCLA. The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Pakootas III, notes that the interpretation of disposal for the purposes of 
RCRA in BNSF does not foreclose a different interpretation of the term “disposal” 
for CERCLA purposes.193 Such a statement by the Ninth Circuit shows an under-
standing that CERCLA and RCRA have differing purposes and objectives, and thus 
CERCLA may require a different interpretation of the term “disposal” to help further 
advance CERCLA’s purpose and objectives. The following section explores CERCLA’s 
purposes in further detail. 
B. CERCLA’s Statutory Scheme and the Aerial Deposition Theory 
To avoid any conflicts among a statute’s sections, all sections of the statute 
must be construed together.194 In addition, related statutes must be construed to-
gether to avoid any conflicts.195 In order to determine if CERCLA is the proper stat-
utory source to hold a manufacturer liable for polluting the water and soil at the 
UCR Site, CERCLA’s statutory scheme must be assessed alone and in conjunction 
with other hazardous waste statutes. 
The statutory scheme of CERCLA can be broken down into three parts.196 First, 
CERCLA was constructed to implicate a range of manufacturing operators and own-
ers, and transporters as potentially responsible parties.197 Second, CERCLA was cre-
ated to offer affirmative defenses to certain potentially responsible parties, thus 
allowing potentially responsible parties to avoid liability under CERCLA.198 Lastly, 
CERCLA seeks to provide judicial or administrative methods to limit a potentially 
responsible party’s liability, or if liability is established, to encourage early settle-
ment.199 
CERCLA’s statutory construction seeks to promote the purpose for which 
CERCLA was enacted.200 The purpose of CERCLA is “[t]o provide for liability, com-
pensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released 
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into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal 
sites.”201 Courts have also implied a secondary purpose behind the enactment of 
CERCLA, “to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances bore the cost 
of remedying the conditions they created.”202 In order to achieve CERCLA’s pur-
poses, CERCLA must be construed liberally.203 
If disposal is to encompass the aerial deposition of hazardous waste from 
manufacturers, all occurrences of the term disposal in CERCLA must allow for such 
inclusion.204 The manner in which the term disposal is defined “has ripple effects on 
the applicability and effectiveness of the available defenses and administrative 
tools that complete the statutory structure” of CERCLA.205 Disposal, and its deriva-
tives, appear in multiple locations throughout CERCLA.206 The first appearance of 
the term disposal is in the definition of facility, “any site or area where a hazardous 
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to 
be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any 
vessel.”207 The next occurrence of the term disposal is within the definition for re-
lease, “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, in-
jecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including 
the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles 
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant).”208 Additionally, 
disposal appears throughout the definition of the four potentially responsible par-
ties: 
(1) [T]he owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dis-
posal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for dis-
posal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such 
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel 
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazard-
ous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for 
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened 
                                                                
 201. Id.  
 202. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 203. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 881.  
 204. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas III), 830 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016).   
 205. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 880. 
 206. Pakootas III, 830 F.3d at 981.  
 207. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 208. § 9601(22) (emphasis added).  
 
166 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
  
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stance . . . .209 
Lastly, the term “disposal” also appears in the bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense210 and the innocent landowner defense.211 The bona fide prospective pur-
chaser defense does not seem to be affected in the amount that the innocent land-
owner defense would be affected if disposal was to encompass the aerial deposition 
theory. The bona fide prospective purchaser defense seeks to promote the pur-
chase of lightly contaminated property from prior hazardous waste disposal, known 
as brownfields, and prevent the purchaser from being held liable for the harm 
caused by the prior disposal.212 Since the disposal of the hazardous waste has al-
ready occurred, under the bona fide prospective purchaser defense, the new land-
owner must “exercise the appropriate care with respect to hazardous substances 
found at the facility by taking reasonable steps to – (i) stop any continuing release; 
(ii) prevent any threated future release; and (iii) prevent or limit human, environ-
mental, or natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous sub-
stance.”213 The term “disposal” only appears in the bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense when stating that the disposal of hazardous waste must have occurred 
prior to the purchaser’s acquisition of the land.214 The remaining language of the 
bona fide prospective purchaser defense uses the term “release,” which is due to 
the definition of release including the abandonment or discharge of receptacles.215 
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Although a derivative of the term “disposal” is included in the definition of release, 
the disposal would have already occurred for the bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense to be applicable.216 Given that the definition of release is interpreted to be 
broader than the definition of disposal,217 it makes sense for the application of the 
bona fide prospective purchaser defense to make sure the appropriate steps are 
exercised to prevent any further or future release of the hazardous waste that has 
already been disposed on the property.218  
The innocent land owner defense allows a landowner to avoid liability when 
“the real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the 
defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance” onto the 
real property.219 To succeed under the innocent landowner defense for prior dis-
posal of hazardous waste, the landowner-defendant must also show that “at the 
time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no 
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or 
threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.”220 The Ninth Circuit has 
expressed concerns regarding the innocent land owner defense and the inclusion 
of aerial depositions under disposal.221 The innocent landowner defense arises 
when the hazardous waste has already been disposed on the property prior to the 
innocent landowner-defendant gaining title.222 Congress intended the innocent 
landowner defense to be construed narrowly, and the innocent landowner defense 
would not be available to anyone who passively or actively disposed of, or released 
hazardous waste, into the environment.223 The Ninth Circuit’s concerns about in-
cluding the aerial deposition theory as a form of disposal, thus creating a never-
ending process and eliminating the innocent land owner defense, are attenuated. 
If aerial depositions are included as a form of disposal the innocent land owner de-
fense would not be eliminated. Rather, the innocent land owner would have to 
trace the hazardous waste that is aerially deposited on the property to the hazard-
ous waste’s owner in order to avoid liability. Aerial depositions would only create 
an issue of traceability and causation that the innocent land owner would have to 
show, and establish, in order to assert the defense. 
Neither the bona fide prospective purchaser nor the innocent landowner de-
fense was at issue in Pakootas III. Rather, the only portion of CERCLA at issue was 
whether Teck Cominco “arranged for disposal” under section 107(a)(3) of 
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CERCLA.224 Given the use of the term disposal, and any derivatives thereof in both 
defenses, it does not follow that allowing for the inclusion of the aerial deposition 
theory would eliminate or alter either defense. The bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense only uses the term “disposal” when referring to how and when the hazard-
ous waste arrived on the property, otherwise the defense uses the term “re-
lease.”225 Since the bona fide prospective purchaser defense seeks to prevent liabil-
ity, if the landowner acts to prevent any ongoing or future release of the hazardous 
waste, such action is likely to already cover any new interpretation of disposal. 
As for the innocent landowner defense, the Ninth Circuit, in an attenuated 
manner, states that allowing for the definition of disposal to encompass the passive 
migration of hazardous waste would result in a perpetual process where every land-
owner after the initial owner would be liable.226 This statement seems to remove 
the aspect of the defense that requires the innocent landowner to “not know [or 
have] no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the 
release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at” the property.227 Since 
the innocent landowner defense requires that the innocent landowner not have 
any knowledge, or not have reason to know that the hazardous waste was disposed 
of on the property, the passive method of disposal does not seem to eliminate the 
defense. Under the innocent landowner, defense the term “disposal” only concerns 
the manner in which the hazardous waste arrived on the property. Therefore, the 
definition of disposal would revert to the party that actually disposed of the hazard-
ous waste, and the current landowner could still assert the innocent landowner de-
fense by tracing the hazardous waste to the party responsible for the hazardous 
waste’s disposal. 
Concern is also expressed that a wider interpretation of the term disposal 
would create even broader potentially responsible party categories.228 A broader 
definition of disposal, which would encompass passive migrations, would not affect 
the first category of potentially responsible parties, as the term disposal, nor any 
derivatives thereof, do not appear in the first category.229 The second potentially 
responsible party category concerns any party who owned or operated a facility at 
the time of the hazardous waste disposal, or where hazardous waste was disposed, 
therefore, the second category seeks to place liability on past owners.230 Therefore, 
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a broader definition of disposal would not drastically affect the second category. 
The third potentially responsible party category concerns parties who arrange for 
hazardous waste to be disposed through some form of agreement or arrange for 
the hazardous waste to be transported for disposal.231 The third category would 
remain unaffected by a broader definition of disposal because it only concerns 
those parties that are arranging for the disposal of hazardous waste. Lastly, the 
fourth potentially responsible party category only concerns those parties who ac-
cept and transport hazardous waste for disposal.232 Each potentially responsible 
party category concerns a party that knows they are in possession of hazardous 
waste, therefore, a broader definition would only affect the precautions each po-
tentially responsible party category would have to take to assure that the hazardous 
waste is disposed of properly. 
Overall, the purpose behind CERCLA’s enactment supports construing the def-
inition of disposal to encompass the passive migrations in accordance with the com-
mon definition of deposit.233 Congress enacted CERCLA with the purpose to hold 
responsible parties liable for the release of hazardous waste into the environment 
and to provide compensation, as well as the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.234 
The fundamental principle that CERCLA is centered on is making the polluter pay 
for any harm caused by the disposal of hazardous waste.235 In order to uphold the 
polluter pay principle and follow the purpose that CERCLA was enacted for, a 
broader definition of disposal is required. Based upon the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to 
allow Washington’s aerial deposition theory to fall within the definition of disposal, 
foreign manufacturers can now exploit a loophole by placing hazardous waste into 
the air and allow the waste to then precipitate from the air into the ground or wa-
ter.236 Although the Clean Air Act would govern aerial emissions that first occur in 
the United States, the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to hold Teck Cominco liable under 
CERCLA for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste in the Upper Columbia River 
Site presents a gap between CERCLA and the Clean Air Act. 
Therefore, the purpose behind CERCLA does support the notion that liability 
could be placed on foreign manufacturers for their aerial depositions of hazardous 
waste that end up in the United States. To uphold CERCLA’s purpose, it is necessary 
that aerial depositions qualify as a form of disposal. To hold otherwise would permit 
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manufacturers to avoid disposing of their hazardous waste by other, safer means, 
and instead place their hazardous waste into the air unconcerned about what ram-
ifications the hazardous waste will have when it precipitates out of the air. An ad-
ditional place to support a possible solution to hold Teck Cominco, and other future 
foreign manufacturers, liable is to assess whether Congress intended CERCLA to ap-
ply in such circumstances. 
C. The Lack of Guidance from CERCLA’s Legislative History 
CERCLA’s legislative history “gives more insight into the ‘Alice-in-Wonder-
land’-like nature of the evolution of [CERCLA] . . . than it does helpful hints on the 
intent of the legislature.”237 Congress had worked on creating “Superfund” hazard-
ous waste bills for three years before finally enacting CERCLA.238 The process of 
passing a federal hazardous waste statute quickened after the Love Canal disaster 
and “the prospect of a transfer of political power in the presidency and in the Sen-
ate.”239 President Ronald Reagan’s election, coupled with a shift in the Senate to a 
Republican majority, created a new sense of urgency for the Carter Administration 
and Congress to enact a new hazardous waste statute.240 Fear spread that the new 
President and Senate would disregard all the prior work done on creating a federal 
hazardous waste management statute and all progress would be lost.241 As a result, 
Congress acted with great speed after the election to enact CERCLA.242 Although 
there were three years of prior work before CERCLA’s enactment, when CERCLA 
was finally enacted there was “virtually no legislative history at all.”243 Congress’s 
final product has been described as follows: 
The bill which became law was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan lead-
ership group of senators (with some assistance from their House counter-
parts), introduced, and passed by the Senate in lieu of all other pending 
measures on the subject. It was then placed before the House, in the form 
of a Senate amendment of the earlier House bill. It was considered [by the 
House] on December 3, 1980, in the closing days of the lame duck session 
of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed, after very limited 
debate, under a suspension of the rules, in a situation which allowed for 
no amendments. Faced with a complicated bill on a take-it-or-leave it ba-
sis, the House took it, groaning all the way.244 
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The search for relevant documents within CERCLA’s legislative history has 
been described as something similar to a “snipe hunt.”245 The lack of legislative his-
tory is likely due to the speed at which CERCLA was enacted.246 CERCLA was a “hast-
ily assembled bill and a fragmented legislative history add[s] to the unusual diffi-
culty of discerning [CERCLA’s] full meaning.”247 As a basic rule, courts will only turn 
to a statute’s legislative history if the statute’s language is ambiguous or to deter-
mine if Congress intended something other than what the statute plainly states.248 
The Ninth Circuit’s review of CERCLA’s legislative history in Carson Harbor revealed 
that there is no indication that Congress meant for nothing more than what dis-
posal’s plain meaning suggests.249 Disposal’s plain meaning in Carson Harbor is ad-
dressed under CERCLA’s former owner liability, whereas in Pakootas III, disposal is 
used for a different CERCLA subsection, arranger liability.250 
The primary goal when CERCLA was enacted was to cleanup abandoned sites 
that were leaking and spilling hazardous waste into the environment.251 Although 
CERCLA’s liability scheme was created to be comprehensive, as the name of the act 
indicates, “the provisions of the statute imposing the liability were not so compre-
hensive . . . [leaving] many issues” to be resolved by the courts.252 
CERCLA’s final form prefers a broad scope of liability, specifically strict liability, 
and only allowing for a few defenses.253 During hearing testimony both the EPA and 
legislators understood that CERCLA would concern itself with a vast range of dis-
posal methods, but at the time of CERCLA’s enactment, the vast range of disposal 
was mainly focused on abandoned waste sites.254 At the time of enactment, CERCLA 
was mainly designed to provide a remedy for past hazardous waste disposal, in 
hopes of preventing hazardous waste catastrophes like the Love Canal incident and 
the Valley of Drums in Kentucky.255 CERCLA’s lack of legislative history makes it im-
possible to determine Congress’s intent for what conduct would constitute a dis-
posal. 
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The lack of legislative history can be used in two ways. First, the silence on 
disposal definition can be interpreted as an express indication that Congress meant 
for the definition to be the same for CERCLA as it is for RCRA. Second, and the better 
interpretation, is that Congress did not imagine CERCLA would be used to hold man-
ufacturers liable for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste. CERCLA was enacted 
as a response to clean up the sites where hazardous waste was being disposed.256 
At the time, for Congress to contemplate that CERCLA would hold foreign manufac-
turers responsible for the harm caused by their aerial depositions would be absurd 
since Pakootas III is the first time CERCLA has been used in such a manner.257 There-
fore, to uphold Congress’s intent that CERCLA will seek broad liability, it is necessary 
for the courts to hold that aerial depositions are encompassed in the definition of 
disposal. 
D. EPA’s Interpretation and the Aerial Deposition Theory 
A full statutory interpretation analysis would look to an agency interpretation, 
and, in this case, the EPA would be the agency providing an interpretation of 
CERCLA.258 The President of the United States is granted authority to administer 
CERCLA;259 however, the President can delegate this power.260 Acting pursuant to 
section 115 to CERCLA, President Regan delegated the power to administer CERCLA 
to the EPA.261 Courts typically give deference to the EPA for any interpretation re-
garding how the statute is to be construed and enforced.262 Currently, the EPA has 
not provided any reference or interpretation to the terms disposal or deposit, 
therefore Chevron deference is inapplicable.263 Although these circumstances do 
not warrant Chevron deference, the EPA has issued multiple consent orders apply-
ing CERCLA’s disposal definition to matters similar to Pakootas III.264 Administrative 
documents, such as the EPA’s consent orders, have been granted some deferential 
respect when presented to the courts.265 The absence of providing Chevron defer-
ence does not foreclose the courts from considering an agency’s interpretation, “[i]t 
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is enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a 
statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”266 The United States’ Department 
of Justice has noted that “[h]undreds of smelter sites alone are contaminated by 
the aerial deposition of hazardous substances that are being or have been cleaned 
up under CERCLA.”267 Here, the EPA has issued several administrative orders dealing 
with the aerial deposition of hazardous waste on distant properties.268 The most 
comparable circumstance where the EPA identified aerial depositions as a form of 
disposal was at the Bunker Hill facility. 
The Bunker Hill facility, located in Northern Idaho, began smelting in 1917.269 
As a result from the smelting and mining activities, several adverse environmental 
and human health issues arose.270 Since smelting and mining operations began, 
large amounts of hazardous waste including lead, arsenic, and mercury were re-
leased into the air and contaminated the soil within the vicinity of the Bunker Hill 
smelting facility.271 Additionally, the EPA held, as a finding of fact, that the six thou-
sand people residing “within the Bunker Hill Superfund site boundaries” are at risk 
of health complications from inhaling or ingesting the hazardous waste.272 The EPA 
also concluded that animals, including aquatic life, and plant species within the Bun-
ker Hill Superfund site boundaries were at risk of consequences resulting from the 
hazardous aerial emissions.273 As a result, the EPA held that Gulf Resource and 
Chemical Corporation, along with other parties, were liable “for all costs of removal 
or remedial actions . . . incurred” pursuant to section 107(a) to CERCLA.274 
Remedial action within the Bunker Hill site presented many dead ends since 
various environmental statutes that would have provided remedies were not appli-
cable in this circumstance.275 RCRA was largely excluded from providing a solution 
to the Bunker Hill site by the Bevill Amendment.276 Additionally, the Clean Air Act 
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was inapplicable after the Bunker Hill smelter ceased operation in 1981 and was no 
longer emitting hazardous waste.277 Lastly, the Clean Water Act provided little help 
since a majority of the heavy metals released into the Coeur d’Alene River came 
from “contaminated soils and sediments and other nonpoint sources.”278 With 
three of the major environmental statutes that could provide remedies largely in-
applicable to the Bunker Hill Site, CERCLA assumed a primary role in establishing a 
solution to the contamination in the Coeur d’Alene Basin.279 Thus, the United States 
Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, and Department of the Interior 
brought a lawsuit against the owners and operators of the mining operations within 
the Coeur d’Alene Basin for natural resource damages, pursuant to CERCLA.280 
The Bunker Hill Superfund site provides a great comparison to the risks Teck 
Cominco’s smelter presents to the communities downwind in Washington. Similar 
to Teck Cominco’s smelter that produced aerial emissions of hazardous waste,281 
the Bunker Hill smelter released aerial emissions containing hazardous waste such 
as sulfur dioxide and lead particulates.282 The aerial emissions from the Bunker Hill 
smelter were found to cause elevated blood-lead levels in a significant number of 
children within the vicinity of the Bunker Hill smelter.283 The high blood-lead levels 
in children within the Bunker Hill smelter vicinity was connected to children unin-
tentionally ingesting contaminated soil and ground water, along with other possible 
ingestion methods such as the inhalation of particulate matter and the consump-
tion of contaminated, locally grown produce and fish.284 The risk presented to the 
community surrounding the Bunker Hill smelter can be extrapolated to the commu-
nities downwind from Teck Cominco’s smelter. The UCR Superfund Site, which is 
the area downwind from Teck Cominco’s smelter, is the portion of the Columbia 
River upstream from the Grand Coulee Dam to the United States-Canada border.285 
The communities within the boundaries of the UCR Site are presented with the 
same risks that were present in the Bunker Hill communities. 
Teck Cominco’s smelting operations in Trail, British Columbia, have resulted 
in highly unnatural levels of heavy metals, including lead and arsenic, in the UCR 
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Site’s soil.286 The high levels of heavy metals in the UCR Site have been attributed 
to the smokestack emissions and past direct hazardous waste releases into the Co-
lumbia River from Teck Cominco’s smelter.287 Given that the UCR Site’s circum-
stances are sufficiently similar to the Bunker Hill site, the application of CERCLA to 
seek natural resource damages from Teck Cominco should be permitted for the aer-
ial deposition of hazardous waste. The only possible road block to establishing 
CERCLA liability against Teck Cominco is CERCAL’s federally permitted release ex-
emption.288 CERCLA’s federally permitted release exemption provides that any 
damage resulting for a permitted release shall be recovered under the applicable 
federal or state law.289 
In the case of Pakootas III, if Teck Cominco’s smelter was located within the 
borders of the United States the aerial emissions of hazardous waste would fall un-
der the Clean Air Act’s authority.290 Since Teck Cominco’s smelter is located outside 
the borders of the United States, the Clean Air Act provides no solution to the aerial 
deposition of hazardous waste in the UCR Site.291 The lack of a remedy under the 
Clean Air Act is again sufficiently similar to CERCLA’s use at the Bunker Hill site.292 
Since the Clean Air Act is inapplicable to establishing liability against Teck Cominco 
for the aerial deposition of hazardous waste in the UCR Site, CERCLA should assume 
primary authority and hold Teck Cominco liable for the natural resource damages 
its smelter has caused in the UCR Site. 
Additional scenarios where the EPA found smelters liable under CERCLA in-
clude the ASARCO smelter in Omaha, Nebraska,293 the Anniston Lead and PCB site 
in Anniston, Alabama,294 and the ACM smelter and refinery site in Great Falls, Mon-
tana.295 The ASARCO smelter in Omaha emitted lead particles that in turn were de-
posited into residential yards.296 Soil samples conducted by the EPA found that high 
levels of lead were present in residential yards within the vicinity of the ASARCO 
smelter, and thus presented a health risk to children.297 Polychlorinated biphenyls 
and lead were released from the Anniston smelter through aerial emissions,298 and 
being deposited into residential properties.299 The ACM smokestack emissions con-
tained lead and other metals, some of which had been deposited over six miles 
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away via aerial emission.300 Similarly, soil samples conducted in Black Eagle, Mon-
tana, revealed that residential yards had high levels of lead, and the aerial emissions 
from the ACM smelter contributed to the contamination of over seventy-eight acres 
in the Black Eagle community.301 
The above smelter consent orders illustrate that the EPA has on multiple oc-
casions found smelters to be liable under CERCLA for the aerial emissions of haz-
ardous waste. When other solutions to fix the problems a smelter’s aerial emissions 
cause to its surrounding communities are absent, CERCLA should be used to address 
and remedy the damage caused. The Ninth Circuit in Pakootas III should have rec-
ognized that neither the Clean Air Act nor any other remedial environmental statute 
was applicable to solve the problems caused by Teck Cominco in the UCR Site. Ap-
plying CERCLA to the aerial deposition of hazardous waste by Teck Cominco pre-
sents a viable solution previously employed by the EPA on multiple occasions, and 
thus should be employed again here. 
V. CONCLUSION 
CERCLA can no longer shy away from attaching liability to the aerial deposi-
tions of hazardous waste. The issue of aerial emissions containing hazardous waste 
crossing international borders will likely become more prominent with increased 
global industrialization. Canada and the United States now have the opportunity to 
solve this transboundary pollution issue, and to present a solution that other neigh-
boring countries worldwide can adopt to avoid the harms associated with hazard-
ous waste emissions. Failing to recognize that CERCLA presents a remedy to the 
aerial deposition dilemma leaves a statutory gap in environmental regulation that 
manufacturers can exploit. 
Although it may seem uncharacteristic to apply CERCLA to a foreign entity, 
now is the time for courts to accept that foreign manufacturers can harm the envi-
ronment and citizens close to territorial borders. First, the United States and Canada 
should revisit the Air Quality Agreement to impose some form of enforcement 
mechanism that will hold the polluting country’s manufacturers liable for the harm 
caused by their pollution. In addition, courts should now recognize that CERCLA is 
not barred from reaching hazardous waste aerial emissions. The term “deposit” il-
lustrates that aerial emissions are a form of disposal under CERCLA. 
There is a need to take a second look at the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Pakootas 
III, and acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect. The occurrence of trans-
boundary air pollution is likely to arise again in the United States judicial system, 
and when it does the Ninth Circuit’s holding should be scrutinized. To control pol-
lution and help preserve the environment, courts should not shy away from apply-
ing CERCLA’s expansive liability power to foreign manufacturers. 
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